When Do Owners Make a Difference?

A Comparison of Market-centered versus Bank-centered Governance
In this paper we examine the link between ownership concentration and agency costs in the crossnational context. A growing body of literature has noted that in addition to principal-agent conflict, ownership interests are, themselves, not homogeneous. Specifically, large shareholders whose holdings allow them to dominate firm decision making, may promote their interests over those of smaller shareholders. This implies that the relationship between ownership concentration, agency costs and firm performance may not be uniform over the range of potential shareholdings This 'principal-principal' agency conflict may be particularly strong where legal protection of less significant shareholders is weak. This paper addresses the following issues:
1. Is the relationship between ownership and firm performance stable over the range of shareholdings, or is there an evolution from monitoring to entrenchment of significant owners?
2. Is the relationship between ownership and firm performance similar in the context of strong investor protection (the US) when compared to Japan, where the 'bank-centered' monitoring system provides weaker protection of shareholders?
3. Agency problems and the effectiveness of shareholder protection and bank-centered monitoring may differ with the economic cycle. By comparing two distinct time periods 1987-1992; and 1993-1997; we are also able to examine whether the influence of significant ownership blocks works differently in periods of economic downturn or renewal. This paper is organized as follows. In Section I we position our research within the existing literature, first by briefly reviewing papers linking ownership concentration and managerial agency costs. We then focus more closely on issues relating to principal-principal agency costs and the phenomenon of ownership entrenchment. This is followed by a discussion of agency theory from a broader international perspective where we provide an overview of bank-centered versus market-centered governance regimes with specific reference to the US and Japanese contexts. Based on our discussion, we formulate hypotheses aimed at investigating the three research questions enumerated previously. Methodology and data description are contained in Section II, with empirical results following in Section III. Our concluding comments, directions for future research, and limitations of the current study are found in Section IV.
I. Ownership Concentration & Corporate Governance
A. From Monitoring to Entrenchment: The role of Significant Ownership Blocks
Agency theory is premised on the fact that the separation of ownership and control will lead to non-value-maximizing decisions by managers. A variety of mechanisms both internal and external to the firm exist which serve to align the divergent interests of owners and managers.
These include ownership structure, monitoring by the board of directors, incentive compensation, use of leverage to constrain free cashflow and the market for corporate control. These issues in turn can be analyzed within the larger framework of how legal context 1 and social context 2 bear upon corporate governance and investor protection.
One of the fundamental principles of agency theory has been that the presence of significant ownership blocks can successfully attenuate managerial agency costs. Inside ownership directly links managerial and owner interests in the absence of managerial entrenchment. Ownership concentrated in the hands of institutional owners or significant outside owners presumably promotes firm monitoring either directly through voice (for example participation on the board of directors) or passively (by selling ownership blocks in poorly managed firms). However, research into the link between firm performance and ownership concentration has yielded confusing results much of which can probably be explained by the heterogeneous identity of owners and the distribution of benefits between significant and minority owners. Recent articles that review empirical literature relating ownership concentration and firm performance from a U.S.
perspective conclude the results are at best mixed, sometimes absent, sometimes positive, and sometimes negative (Holderness (2003) ). Dalton, Daily, Certo and Roengpitya (2003) conduct a meta-analysis of prior empirical studies linking ownership concentration and firm performance.
Their results are perhaps the most convincing and yet the most disconcerting concerning ownership and performance links. No consistent associations are detected when examining, ownership by CEO, officer, director, institutional or blockholder equity. Such perplexing results
can be linked to two phenomena: (i) the heterogeneous interests of diverse owners and (ii) the evolving divergence of interests between influential owners and minority owners as ownership stakes rise (the principal-principal agency problem).
The Divergent Interests of Owners
Ownership concentrated in the hands of insiders will likely have a substantially different effect than that concentrated in the hands of institutions, outside individuals, families, government, or foreign investors, at least insofar as constraining agency costs is concerned. Both theoretically and empirically, the results obtained from the study of managerial ownership entrenchment seem less in dispute than other types of ownership studies although the efficacy of inside holdings as a means of aligning shareholder and manager interests is debatable. Wright, Ferris, Sarin and Awasthi (1996) find that high levels of inside ownership induce executive decisions inconsistent with growth-oriented risk taking. Arguing nonuniformity across different inside ownership levels, both McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) point to the entrenchment of inside owners beyond certain ownership levels. Competing studies, however, suggest that variations in ownership and performance are due to the endogenous nature of ownership (Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) ; Jensen, Solberg and Zorn (1992) ).
As for the impact of outside holdings, there is evidence that differences among owners' preferences are present. For example, there is some support for the proposition that the time horizons and risk preferences of large shareholders and certain categories of institutional investors differ from those of other shareholders. (Wright, Ferris, Sarin and Awasthi (1996) ; Zahra (1996); Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson and Grossman (2002) ; Holderness and Sheehan (1988) ).
Although usually considered to be an important source of external monitoring, Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson and Grossman (2002) argue that certain categories of institutional investors may be more closely tied to the firm. Mehran (1995) examines holdings of outside directors and is unable to detect a significant relationship between such holdings and firm performance, nor of any other group of owners (individuals, institutions, or corporations). Similarly, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) do not document a relationship between performance and blockholdings. However, these authors do not conclude an absence of effect, but rather suggest that the impact of large ownership blocks will differ across firms and that an optimal ownership concentration level exists. Other research, including Zajac and Westphal (1994); McConnell and Servaes (1995); and McConnell and Servaes (1990) ; suggests that monitoring by large external blockholders serves to alleviate managerial agency problems.
In many regards, the extensive empirical and theoretical literature linking agency costs and ownership structure suffer from so many drawbacks that the simple and appealing idea of owners aligning managerial and shareholder interests in a Pareto-optimal fashion (so as not to make any other group of stakeholders worse off, for example, minority shareholders), or the monitoring function carried out by significant outside holdings (both institutions and individuals) is at odds with the copious conflicting empirical literature. Certainly, early studies that examined ownership-performance links more often than not failed to consider the possibility that ownership effects would not be uniform across all ownership levels. Even those studies that posited or detected a disjoint effect (Brailsford, Oliver and Pua (1999) ; Cui and Mak (2002); Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Raman (2001); Wright, Ferris, Sarin and Awasthi (1996) ; Shleifer and Vishny (1989) ) tended to focus mostly on managerial agency problems rather than consider the phenomenon of entrenchment by other classes of owners.
Principal-Principal Agency Conflicts
Relatively less attention has been focused upon the general entrenchment propensities of influential owners. Essentially, the strategic and performance characteristics of firms with highly concentrated ownership (regardless of identity) may differ from those with more dispersed ownership and lead to principal-principal agency conflict. Holderness (2003) Although, Holderness (2003) alludes to the propensity of significant blockholders to engage in the consumption of private benefits to the detriment of other shareholders, he concludes that ownership concentration in the hands of blockholders appears to have little impact on firm performance, or at best a benign influence. Nevertheless, there has been no thorough empirical investigation to date of the magnitude of principal-principal agency problems that are associated with concentrated ownership, nor at what level of ownership concentration they are likely to occur. Additionally, given the far greater incidence of ownership concentration outside the U.S.
coupled frequently with socio-economic contexts that do not promote protection of investor rights, the consequences of concentrated ownership, not only as managerial monitors, but also as self-serving interest groups, remains largely unexamined.
Blockholder Governance
The term "blockholder governance" has emerged to describe the phenomenon of concentrated ownership coupled with the presumption that significant ownership stakes constrain managerial agency costs. Becht, Bolton and Roell (2002) trace the evolution of blockholder governance models. They point out that although this arrangement is less common in Anglo-Saxon governance structures due to regulatory restrictions on ownership concentration, in Europe and OECD countries, blockholder governance frequently dominates. They cite, for example, Grossman and Hart (1980) who point to the role of large shareholders in facilitating the market for corporate control and hence indirectly facilitate alignment of owner-manager interests. In a similar vein, Leland and Pyle (1977) suggest that the retention of a significant block of shares in going-public transactions is viewed as a commitment by the owners to actively monitor managers. Nevertheless, the ability of powerful shareholders to monitor managers depends at least in part on the liquidity of the secondary market. Essentially powerful owners have the choice to remain passive, use "voice", or vote with their feet. In countries with relatively illiquid secondary markets the latter strategy is unavailable. Thus numerous authors including Roe (1994) and Coffee (1991) suggest liquid secondary markets serve as a disincentive for owner monitoring, while conversely, thin markets tend to coincide with models of blockholder governance.
Competing views of the role of blockholders in illiquid market contexts, however, suggests that the ability of powerful owners to trade on inside information is enhanced and thus owner entrenchment is promoted in place of owner monitoring.
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Reconciling the Monitoring and Entrenchment Propensities of Influential Owners
As previously discussed, monitoring by influential owners is not inconsistent with principalprincipal agency theory. In fact, we argue that, initially, significant owners can perform a valuable oversight function. However, as ownership stakes grow, we anticipate divergence of interests between powerful owners and diffuse owners as the temptation to consume private benefits to the detriment of other stakeholders begins to take hold. Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (2002) provide evidence of this phenomenon in their study of eight Asian countries. As Becht, Bolton and Roell (2002) observe: "There is only a short step from over-monitoring to downright expropriation, self-dealing or collusion with management at the expense of minority shareholders." (Becht, Bolton and Roell (2002) ; page 35). One objective of the present research therefore, is to investigate whether or not the relationship between ownership and firm performance is stable over the range of shareholdings, or if there is an evolution from monitoring to entrenchment of significant owners.
Accordingly we have formulated hypotheses regarding agency costs and firm performance that capture both the oversight function of significant owners, as well as their potential to consume private benefits.
Profitability and Risk
When powerful owners serve as active managerial monitors, agency costs should be diminished and we would therefore anticipate greater profitability from firms displaying lower agency costs.
When powerful owners not only enjoy private benefits of control but also pursue their own agendas to the detriment of minority shareholders, we anticipate that ownership concentration will be associated with lower profitability. A negative association between profitability and ownership concentration would, for example, be indicative of the "tunneling" behavior described by Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2000) . We propose:
Hypothesis 1a: Profitability is positively related to ownership concentration when managerial monitoring occurs.
Hypothesis 1b: Profitability decreases at higher levels of ownership concentration when powerful owners consume private benefits.
According to agency theory, managers impose their individual risk aversion profiles on shareholders, leading to the well-known under-investment problems (Jensen and Meckling (1976) ). Empirically, Wright, Ferris, Sarin and Awasthi (1996) 
Agency Costs of Free Cashflow
The abuse of free cashflow is a hallmark of managerial agency costs. For example, self-seeking managers would prefer to use liquid assets of the firm to finance new investment rather than exposing the firm to the scrutiny of the market place (Jensen (1986) ; Klock and Thies (1995) ).
Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999) provide empirical evidence that suggests that U.S.
firms with good access to capital markets tend to hold less cash than those that do not. However, they also observe that firms with strong growth opportunities and riskier investment cashflows tend to hold a greater proportion of liquid assets. Brush, Bromiley and Hendrickx (2000) find that sales growth in firms with free cashflow is less profitable than firms with less liquidity among firms with weak corporate governance structures. However, a number of recent papers including Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (2002) ; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2002); and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) point to the severity of agency problems between influential shareholders and minority shareholders. In fact Shleifer and Vishny (1997) emphasize that outside North America, the real issue of concern is not managerial agency problems, but those related to principal-principal conflicts. We propose:
Hypothesis 4a: Free cashflow is inversely related to ownership concentration when managerial monitoring occurs.
Hypothesis 4b: Free cashflow is positively related to ownership concentration when powerful owners exhibit entrenched behavior.
Market Assessment of Governance
In firms with substantive governance issues, we might expect that the market would discount the value of the earnings of these firms. Thus we expect that at higher ownership concentration levels, the existence of principal-principal agency problems would be consistent with a negative relationship between ownership and the price-earnings ratio. In contrast, if ownership concentration is perceived as beneficial due to the monitoring services provided, the relationship between concentration and the price earnings ratio should be positive and significant. We propose:
Hypothesis 5a: The price-earnings ratio and ownership concentration are positively related when managerial monitoring occurs.
Hypothesis 5b: The price-earnings ratio and ownership concentration are negatively related when powerful owners exhibit entrenchment behaviors.
B. Agency Theory in an International Context
Is the relationship between ownership and firm performance similar in the context of strong investor protection (the US) when compared to Japan, where the 'bank-centered' monitoring system provides weaker protection of shareholders? Examination of agency issues becomes more complex in the context of cross-national differences in regulation and institutional environment.
Indeed, there has been a growing recognition that the North America model of strong investor protection is the exception rather than the rule (Denis and McConnell (2003) ; La Porta, LopezDe-Silanes and Shleifer (1999)). In fact, numerous researchers have noted that the strong shareholder-centered monitoring system found in North America is, in many respects, atypical (2000)). In fact, many of these studies point out that ownership concentration is the logical fallout from weak investor protection. Moreover, due to differences in the level of investor protection across countries, there is an emerging consensus that not only is concentrated ownership observed more frequently outside North America, its impact upon firm performance will be more pronounced. (Denis and McConnell (2003) ).
Strong investor protection, liquid secondary markets, and relatively dispersed ownership characterize market-centred governance. At the other end of the governance spectrum we find weaker investor protection, more concentrated ownership structures, and frequently bank-centred governance. It is important, however, to emphasize that the dichotomy is not so much one of bank versus market centrality but perhaps more one of legal protections of investor rights. (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000)). For example, the legal environment plays an extremely important role in determining whether or not dispersed ownership will be the norm or the exception. In turn, the legal environment will influence the ability of important owners to enjoy private benefits of control. Denis and McConnell (2003) and Coffee (1999) argue that "functional" convergence in governance has been taking place. While the U.S. has seen a rise in ownership concentration, countries such as Japan have shown movement toward more outside participation on Boards of Directors. Although reduction of managerial agency costs as well as creditor shareholder conflicts are often viewed as a benefit of bank-centered governance structures, bank-centered monitoring could lead to an exacerbation of principal-principal agency conflicts due to weaker investor protections.
Nevertheless, such governance structures could also temper such conflicts. First, shareholdings by a broader range of financial stakeholders may moderate the impact of dominant shareholdings, as noted by Aoki (2000) . Second, the greater involvement of financial stakeholders may provide for more informed monitoring of the firm (Aoki (1994) ; (2000)).
In contrasting market-centered and bank-centered governance, as typified by the United States and Japan, one observes that the extent and type of input available to shareholders also differs.
North American owners typically exert formal, arms-length input into corporate governance through the board of directors, shareholder initiatives, and the like. In particular, institutional investors act as external monitors and play an active role in corporate governance. Conversely, in Japan, non-bank institutional investors play a relatively passive role in formal corporate governance, whereas inter-corporate and bank shareholders act as 'quasi-insiders', linked to the focal firm through other types of ties (buyer-seller relationships, bank ties, board interlocks, etc.) (Gibson (1998) ). While these quasi-inside shareholders may have significant input into firm decision-making, they may also pursue private benefits to the detriment of other stakeholders.
In addition to the overall patterns of ownership and financing described above, keiretsu groupings play a critical role in the Japanese economy. There are six commonly recognized horizontal keiretsu: Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Fuji, Sanwa, and Dai Ichi Kango. These long-standing historical relationships reinforce the in-group debt and equity holdings of keiretsu firms. The ownership structure of firms is dominated by group holdings (the main bank and its affiliates), which range from 23%-42% (Gerlach (1992) ; Hoshi (1994) ). Moreover, shares in keiretsu firms are less frequently traded and when traded, they are likely to be placed with a previous shareholder, usually a keiretsu member (Johnston and McAlevey (1998) ).
To summarize, investigation of the link between ownership concentration and principal-principal agency problems must consider the dominant governance model. It matters little whether the distinction is drawn between bank-centered or market-centered; or between blockholder governance models versus dispersed ownership governance models. Essentially, bank-centered systems for a variety of reasons frequently coincide with blockholder dominance, even though in absolute terms the size of the ownership blocks may be smaller than in market-centered governance systems. While the "strength of weak ties" might prevail in the Japanese context, particularly among keiretsu members, the associated de-facto "pyramiding" of ownership stakes potentially can engender serious principal-principal agency problems.
The preceding discussion suggests that the impact of ownership concentration in controlling managerial agency costs and in stimulating principal-principal conflicts will differ in distinct national contests. Thus we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 6a: Smaller ownership stakes have greater impact on firm performance and agency costs for Japanese firms, relative to US firms.
Hypothesis 6b: The impact of ownership concentration in independent Japanese firms (nonkeiretsu firms) will resemble North American patterns.
D. Market and Bank-Centered Systems in the Context of Economic Change
Recent events such as the economic downturn in Asia and current criticisms of North American corporate governance systems in the wake of Enron, WorldCom, and the like, have raised important questions regarding the continued effectiveness of either system. Traditional criticisms of the North American model have focused on the 'short-termism' (Porter (1992) of this system when compared to bank-centered systems. Some research suggests that by providing more ready access to capital and more informed monitoring by the firm, bank-centered systems may be particularly useful during times of economic downturn, and may better allow firms to overcome temporary financial downturns Bank-centered systems, however, have been increasingly criticized in regard to their monitoring effectiveness (Bayoumi (1999); Genay (1999) ). Indeed, critics have noted that by protecting firms from financial pressures, bank-centered systems may provide fewer incentives for firms to remain competitive (Kim and Hoskisson (1996); Johnston (1995) ). The large number of 'bad loans' held by Japanese banks, estimated at 7% of GDP (Genay (1999) ) can be seen as evidence of this phenomena (Asian Wall Street Journal (1995); Bayoumi (1999) ). Further, the stable access to capital found in bank-centered systems is not without its costs (Weinstein and Yafeh (1998); Paker and Hodder (2002) ; Drake and Hall (2003) ). Both Yafeh (1998) and Weber and Devaney (2002) provide evidence consistent with significantly higher costs of capital for bank-based firms. Despite earlier arguments that advantages of a bank-centered system may be most significant during times of economic distress, the benefit of bank-centered financing to firms in distress has been questioned (Hall and Weinstein (2000) . Further, bank-centered systems have been criticized for impeding the regulatory change that would encourage greater market responsiveness (Weber and Devaney (2002) ). Ito (1997) and Dow and McGuire (1999) suggest that the characteristics of the Japanese industrial system which have contributed to the growth of the Japanese economy may now act as constraints and although Japanese industrial organization has been particularly stable in times of economic change, this does not imply insulation from economic downturns. (McGuire and Dow (2003) ). Kang and Shivdasani (1995) point out that in Japanese firms with significant blockholders, the response to changing economic conditions is more rapid when compared to Japanese firms with more dispersed ownership. Relative to the U.S., however, response time is slower.
Despite this lack of clear consensus regarding the relative advantages of bank-centered and market-centered corporate governance during different economic conditions, a number of studies take the view that while monitoring by powerful owners may be more in evidence during periods of economic downturn this would be less likely in bank-centered contexts. We therefore hypothesize:
Hypothesis 7: Monitoring by concentrated owners is more pronounced during periods of economic downturn.
Hypothesis 8: Owner monitoring during periods of economic downturn will be less pronounced when the bank-centered governance model is dominant.
II. Methodology and Data Description
A. Sample Description
Examination of our research questions requires data on firms in bank-centered and marketcentered systems over distinct economic time periods. Japan and the US are generally considered to exemplify bank-centered and market-centered systems respectively. A further distinction can be made between keiretsu and non-keiretsu firms in Japan. Firms tied to one of the major bankcentered keiretsu are particularly tightly linked to their main bank. Although non-keiretsu Japanese firms also make extensive use of bank loans, they are less tightly tied to banks. Despite some contradictory evidence (Hall and Weinstein (2000) ), most studies have found differences in the characteristics and implications of bank ties between keiretsu and non-keiretsu firms Dow (2003, Paker and Hodder (2002) ; Weinstein and Yafeh (1998); Ouandlous and Philippatos (1999) ). Consequently, we distinguish between keiretsu and non-keiretsu Japanese firms.
Data on keiretsu affiliation are obtained from Industrial Groupings in Japan for the years 1990-1991 and 1996-1997 . These bi-annual references are the accepted source of information regarding group membership and ties and have been used in previous studies. We use classification as a member of the five major horizontal keiretsu as listed in Industrial Groupings in Japan for each year to identify keiretsu firms. 6 Thus, the sample includes firms identified as either independent or affiliated in each of the two time periods. We also match the US and Japanese sample in terms Firms in the Japanese sample are somewhat larger than their US counterparts and it is also noteworthy that the industrial distribution of firms in the US sample is somewhat larger. In essence, we tried to draw comparative samples which would also be somewhat reflective of the national economic landscapes of the country. Thus our final samples of US and Japanese firms are comparable but not identical.
Also, due to missing observations for some variables the actual sample employed varied slightly from the total number of firms initially included in the sample.
B. Variables
The variables used in this study are described below.
Dependent Variables: 3
• Profitability: ROA as reported in Worldscope
• Liquidity: Quick Ratio as reported in Worldscope
• Capital Expenditure: General and Administrative Expenses as a percentage of sales, calculated from income statement and balance sheet data contained in Worldscope.
• Risk: Beta as reported in Worldscope • Two digit SIC industry controls contained in Worldscope
• Leverage control: The ratio of total debt to total assets as reported by Worldscope.
• Size: The natural logarithm of net sales in local currency as reported by Worldscope Independent Variables :
• Ownership Concentration: the percentage of the firm held by blocks of 5% (or more).
This was obtained from the Japan Company Handbook for Japanese firms, and Disclosure for US firms.
3 In this research a wider range of variables were actually examined. For example, for profitability we looked at five year average estimates, as well as single year estimates for ROA, ROE, and Market/Book. We selected variables that we thought best represented the results and could most clearly demonstrate where entrenchment versus monitoring was in evidence. Reporting these results would strengthen are arguments but at the same time we thought this would be at the expense of unduly complicating the interpretation of our findings. These results are available upon request from the authors.
C. Model specification
Identification of Switch Points
We first examine the relationship between agency proxies and performance variables and ownership concentration by employing separate OLS regressions given by equation (1) 
The minimum value obtained in (4) may be where the switch point in the regression regimes occurs, although there is no statistical test to support this hypothesis. To derive a more robust statistical procedure we employed recursive residuals. We then plotted the cumulative recursive residuals about the zero line and identified residuals that lay outside an "error band", defined as plus and minus two standard deviations away from zero. Ownership levels associated with the residuals outside the error band suggest that a structural change in the regression relationship could have occurred. We then re-estimated the relationship, splitting the sample into two groups: above and below the point where the structural change is thought to occur. The Chow test for equality of regression parameters is then used to determine if there is a statistical difference in the coefficients above and below the switch point.
Analysis of the Relationship Between Ownership and the Dependent Variables
Since our methodology does not allow us to directly control for size or industry effect in the switching analysis, we re-estimated the relationship between the six dependent variables and ownership concentration including the control variables. This allowed us to ascertain whether switch points, such as identified, actually were mere proxies for differences in industry, size, leverage, or institutional investment. We then used these "full models" to examine the relationship between ownership and the six dependent variables above and below switch points such as were identified.
III. Empirical Results
The analysis consisted of evaluating switch points for 6 groups of firms: US firms in 1992 (US relationship between five percent ownership and ROA is significant and negative. In stronger economic times, Keiretsu owners appear to monitor. In poorer times there remains some monitoring activity which is abandoned at higher levels for entrenchment tendencies.
Insert Tables 1, 1A , and 1B about here
B. Risk and Ownership Concentration
Results for risk are presented in Table 2 . With the exception of non-keiretsu firms in 1997, the relationship is negative and significant. Moreover, for all categories of firms examined, the relationship is stable. These stable relationships are consistent with the hypothesis that significant owners avoid risky projects and thus may pursue objectives that are inconsistent with overall shareholder wealth maximization. and beta. This result is consistent with the owner entrenchment hypothesis.
Insert Table 2 about here
C. Capital Expenditure and Ownership Concentration
Results for the relationship between ownership concentration and capital expenditure activity are presented in Table 3 . For US firms in 1992 and 1997 the relationship is negative and significant overall. Powerful owners do not positively impact capital expenditure. This result is thus consistent with the entrenchment hypothesis. However, the impact is not uniform over all ownership levels. As indicated in Table 3A, Table 3B , the relationship between five percent ownership and capital expenditure becomes negative and significant beyond ownership levels of 10.40 %. Below this point, moreover, we do not detect evidence of monitoring. In the tougher economic time period toward the end of the decade, keiretsu owners appear to monitor when ownership is less than 19.80%, as evidenced by the positive and significant coefficient for ownership in Table 3C . Beyond this level, however, monitoring is abandoned.
Insert Tables 3, 3A , 3B and 3C about here Tables 4B and 4CKeiretsu members, both in 1992 and in 1997, the relationships are positive and significant which is consistent with entrenchment. For keiretsu firms in 1992 at very high levels of ownership the coefficient is negative and significant which is consistent with the monitoring hypothesis. However, as revealed in Table 4B , in this ownership range institutional ownership is also negative and significant, thus suggesting that for very high levels of five percent ownership concentration, institutional investors may take over a monitoring function. Tables 5A and 5B , the relationships are not stable for keiretsu firms in 1992 and in 1997. In 1992, for keiretsu firms displaying ownership concentration of greater than 6.10%, the coefficient for five percent ownership is negative and weakly significant which is consistent with the monitoring hypothesis. However, in 1997 above concentration levels of 5.60%, the coefficient is positive and significant. In this later time period, powerful owners of keiretsu firms display tendencies toward entrenchment rather than monitoring.
C. Liquidity and Ownership Concentration
Insert Tables 4, 4A, 4B, and 4C about here
D. Abuse of Free Cashflow and Ownership Concentration
Insert Tables 5, 5A and 5B about here Table 6 contains the results of our analysis of the relationship between the price-earnings ratio and five percent ownership concentration. Overall, for all categories of firms in the study, there is no significant relationship. However, for US firms in 1997 the relationship is not stable. As reported in Table 6A , for ownership levels of up to 81.81% there is a positive and significant relationship which is consistent with the monitoring hypothesis. For very high levels of ownership, the coefficient is not significant. Very powerful and concentrated owners appear to abandon monitoring. In Table 6 we note that switch points also occurred for firms in the US 1992 category and non-keiretsu firms in 1997. However, inspection of the coefficients for five percent ownership above and below these points did not yield useful economic interpretation since coefficients were never statistically significant for five percent ownership.
E. Price-Earnings and Ownership Concentration
Insert Tables 6 and 6A about here
E. Owner-monitoring and Owner-Entrenchment in different economic time periods.
In Exhibit 1 we have summarized our results according to findings of owner-monitoring versus owner-entrenchment in different time periods for different sub-samples of firms. For US firms, monitoring is in evidence for ROA and the price-earnings ratio in 1992. In the later period of slower economic growth, it appears only liquidity is actively monitored by powerful owners. For US firms in 1992, risk and capital expenditure both appear to be objects of owner entrenchment.
In the later period of slower economic growth there seems to be somewhat greater emphasis on entrenchment as evidenced by the relationship between ownership concentration and the following dependent variables: risk, capital expenditure, and liquidity. Contrary to what we had initially proposed, for US firms, monitoring is more effective in good economic times, and when downturns occur, the pursuit of private benefits appears to top the agenda. In Japan, the economic successes of the earlier time period and the subsequent downturn in the business cycle were more pronounced than in North America. For keiretsu firms, owner monitoring is in evidence for measures of free cashflow abuse and liquidity 1992 and for profitability and capital expenditure in 1997. For Keiretsu firms, entrenchment is more frequently in evidence than is the case for US firms and the consequences are potentially more grave in slower economic times, since the objects of entrenchment in 1997 are profits, abuse of free cash flow, and liquidity, whereas in 1992, entrenchment was in evidence for risk, capital expenditure and liquidity, with profits left untouched. but entrenchment is observed and on-going for measures of profitability, risk and abuse of free cashflow. Our results do not support hypothesis 7, that owner monitoring may, in general, be stronger during periods of economic downturn. In fact our results are more consistent with greater entrenchment and less monitoring in slower times. Moreover, block holder governance, as typified by Keiretsu firms, coincides with less monitoring and more serious entrenchment in slower economic times. This result is more consistent with hypothesis 8: "Owner monitoring during periods of economic downturn will be less pronounced when the bankcentered governance model is dominant."
We also should add that non-keiretsu firms in either time period did not show strong signs of either entrenchment or monitoring. While these firms are dominated "culturally" by a blockholder governance mentality, they are in many respects more market oriented and therefore more akin to US firms. The relationship between ownership concentration and agency cost proxies did not bear out this conjecture.
F. Is There a Magic Number ? When do Owners Make a Difference ?
Re-examination of Exhibit 1 shows that monitoring by significant owners and perhaps more importantly, entrenchment of influential owners, occurs at lower levels of ownership concentration in bank-centered governance regimes as opposed to market-centered regimes.
While it is frequently argued that smaller ownership stakes can be more powerful in bankcentered governance structures such as the keiretsu, it also seems this is a double-edged sword.
Powerful keiretsu owners exhibit entrenchment propensities at much lower levels of ownership than occur in the US.
IV. Conclusions and Directions for Future Research
Our empirical results suggest overall that ownership entrenchment is an observable phenomenon, particularly among keiretsu firms, but also to a lesser extent, among US firms and independent Japanese firms. Our results are consistent with recent conjectures by Denis and McConnell (2003) , that cross-holdings and the existence of powerful ownership structures in keiretsu firms engender substantial principal-principal agency problems. Furthermore, our analysis adds empirical content to the argument that the problems arising from the separation of ownership and control are less serious outside the North American context but are replaced by the more substantive issue of principal-principal conflicts.
The present research sheds light on a number of issues related to corporate governance and crossnational comparisons of governance systems. We add to the body of empirical literature which has demonstrated that significant ownership blocks work differently in bank-centered as opposed to market-centered governance systems. We also show that the impact of powerful owners on firm performance, as well as a variety of variables which approximate agency costs, differs according national context. These results thus provide empirical support to the arguments of La Porta and his collegues (1999, 2000, 2002) . We further find some evidence that suggests that the ability to consume private benefits is in some ways enhanced in slower economic times, and that powerful owners may focus even more ardently on their private agendas at these times. Moreover this is particularly true for keiretsu firms, where the blockholder governance model dominates.
The empirical technique employed in this study allows the data to speak for itself. Thus, rather
than conjecturing at what level ownership may significantly impact performance, or at what level entrenchment may occur; switching regressions allow us to empirically assess the inflection point. Our results indicate that ownership entrenchment occurs in both bank-centered as well as market-centered governance regimes and entrenchment is perhaps more serious among keiretsu firms. We are also able to show that monitoring by significant owners and perhaps more importantly, entrenchment of influential owners, occurs at lower levels of ownership concentration in bank-centered governance regimes as opposed to market-centered regimes.
Our analysis of the relationship between ownership concentration and selected agency and performance variables reveals that the relationship is often not stable and can change directions or significance when ownership reaches critical impact levels. Our results pertaining to keiretsu firms are of particular interest. As noted in the text, due to cross holding of shares, as well as the subtle ties between a variety of stakeholders in the keiretsu system, smaller ownership stakes are likely to be very powerful. While the keiretsu system may have attenuated many of the managerial agency costs, it appears this may be at the cost of promoting agendas which are to the detriment of shareholders in general.
In this study we examine only one potential governance mechanism: significant ownership stakes.
We do not examine the identity of these owners: e.g. institutional, family and inside ownership.
We also do not consider any interaction that might occur among different governance mechanisms. Thus the finding that for many variables the relationship is insignificant does not suggest that such firms are unprofitable, hold too much excess cash, etc. but rather may indicate that monitoring is not taking place by owners and that another mechanism is in place.
Alternatively, the empirical results are important insofar as they shed light on the phenomenon of owner entrenchment. Too much of a good thing appears to be the case. More is not necessarily better, in fact often its worse. None None (a) below the switch point the relationship is positive and above the switch point the relationship is negative. However the coefficients are not significant. None (a) from output at higher levels of ownership the coefficient is negative and sig. At .125 (weakly significant) Other switch points examined did not substantively impact the sign or significance of the coefficients. N = 539 R-Square = 0.034 N = 71 R-Square = 0.080
Exhibit 1 Monitoring Versus Entrenchment
